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1. Introduction 
Scientific models have become essential and ubiquitous in contemporary science. Scientists 
dedicate much of their time to the construction, development, and testing of models. And 
scientific journals provide forums for their presentation and discussion. Paradigmatic 
examples include the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey population, the Bohr model of 
hydrogen atoms, Watson and Crick’s double helix model of DNA, Kendrew’s plasticine 
model of myoglobin molecules, and Newton’s model of the solar system. In recent years 
there has been an increasing number of philosophical, historical and sociological works on 
models. Historians and sociologists of science have analysed a vast number of case studies. 
At the same time, philosophers of science have enquired into fundamental questions 
concerning their nature and functions.	  
Axel Gelfert’s book, How to Do Science with Models. A Philosophical Primer, offers a clear 
and accessible introduction to the contemporary philosophical debate on models that 
combines the descriptive aims of historical and sociological studies with the normative-
theoretical ambition of philosophy of science. The reader finds interesting philosophical 
insights, a wide range of case studies from the natural sciences, and some historical context. 
The first two chapters provide a systematic survey of the contemporary philosophical debate 
on the nature of models and on how they represent real world phenomena. The third chapter 
identifies recurring strategies of model building by analysing a wide range of case studies 
from condensed matter physics to population biology. The last two chapters advance the 
philosophical debate by identifying exploration as one of the core functions of models 
together with explanation and prediction, and by developing the idea that models enable and 
constrain the activities of their users. 
Gelfert submits that the main assumption of his book ‘is that the key to answering any of the 
more fundamental questions about scientific models lies in the diversity of their varied uses 
and functions’ (2016, 4). He starts with a survey of the existent explanations of what models 
are, including the syntactic view of theories1 (according to which scientific theories are 
axiomatized collections of sentences in a given logical domain), the semantic view2 
(according to which theories are collections of mathematical models), and the more recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Carnap (1937, 1966), Hempel (1966). 
2 Giere (1988), Suppes (1960), Suppe (1989), Van Fraassen (1980), French and Ladyman (1999). 
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fiction view of models3 (according to which models are ontologically on par with the fictions 
of literature and the arts). But none of these emerges as his favourite, and he does not offer an 
alternative explanation.  
In the absence of a generally accepted unified account of what models are, some have 
abandoned the quest altogether in favour of a characterisation of models as functional 
entities. Among them, Stephen French (2010) argues for a so-called quietist approach to 
models, according to which we do not need to answer the ontological question in order to 
explain the scientific practice of modelling. And Gelfert himself endorses a functional 
characterisation of models  and argues that ‘the various functions of models in scientific 
enquiry are our best—and perhaps only—guide when it comes to finding answers to any of 
the more fundamental questions about scientific models, including those about their ontology, 
epistemic status, confirmation, and so forth’ (ibid., 25). Following Giere (1999), Gelfert 
distinguishes between two main functional characterisations of models, the instantial view 
and the representational view. According to the former, a model of a theory is anything of 
which the theory is a true description (e.g. Suppes 1960). According to the latter, models are 
representations of real systems (e.g., Giere 2010, Chakravartty 2010). But models have a 
number of other functions as well. For example, they are mediators between theories and the 
world (Morrison and Morgan 1999), they are epistemic artefacts furthering scientific 
knowledge (Knuuttila 2005), they provide model explanations (Bokulich 2009), and they are 
tools for theory construction (Hartmann 1995). In fact, I believe that Gelfert’s most 
significant contribution to the contemporary debate on models consists in his identification of 
exploration as a special function of what he calls exploratory models.  
In what follows I will present the way in which Gelfert develops the notion of exploration in 
Section 2, and I will critically assess it in Section 3. The upshot will be that while this is a 
genuinely new notion that deserves to be further developed, Gelfert’s characterization is 
largely incomplete and the use he makes of the term ‘exploratory model’ needs to be 
amended to match the current use modellers make in different scientific areas.   
 
2. Gelfert on exploratory models 
Philosophers of science have already recognized a general notion of exploration as one of the 
main functions of models as special tools of scientific enquiry. Some have claimed that 
models involve a special cognitive function called ‘surrogative reasoning’ (Swoyer 1991) or 
‘model-based reasoning’ (Magnani and Nersessian 2002, Magnani, Nersessian and Thagard 
1999), which consists in the development and manipulation of a model system – a surrogate 
or analogue of a real system – that licenses certain inferences about reality. Gelfert points out 
that model-based understanding has been interpreted as involving simulations of model 
behaviour (Stöckler 1997) and manipulation of model systems (Morgan 2012), and he 
connects these features to a special ‘exploratory mode of interacting with them’ (Gelfert 
2016, 74). 
Gelfert starts by sketching an alternative notion of exploration in terms of Daniel Berlyne’s 
(1960) psychological distinction between diversive exploration and specific exploration. 
Diversive exploration is response-oriented in that an agent ‘seeks novelty or surprise for its 
own sake’ (Gelfert 2016, 75), while specific exploration is stimulus-oriented in that it ‘is a set 
of behaviours in response to a novel or unexpected stimulus’ (ibid., 74). Gelfert suggests that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Frigg (2010), Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009), Levy (2015), Toon (2012), Salis (2016). 
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diversive exploration may be a way to generate hypotheses, while specific exploration may 
be a way to investigate specific hypotheses and their consequences either theoretically or by 
conducting an experiment. In particular, specific exploration may consist in a set of 
behaviours such as ‘focus our attention on a salient theoretical question, explore ways of 
completing a mathematical proof, or attempt to resolve an ambiguity in meaning by trying 
different interpretations’ (ibid., 74-5).  
Starting from this notion of specific exploration, Gelfert submits that the analogy that is 
really crucial to the identification of a special exploratory function of models derives from the 
philosophical literature on so-called exploratory experiments. As Burian (1997, 2007) and 
Steinle (1997, 2002) characterise them, these are experiments that are performed in the 
absence of a (mature) theory of the phenomena under investigation. Exploratory experiments 
play a key role in the process of conceptual change and innovation that leads to the formation 
and stabilization of new conceptual frameworks. Gelfert builds on this analogy to identify a 
special class of exploratory models that, just like exploratory experiments, play a key role in 
the formation and stabilization of new conceptual frameworks. In his own words:  
Just as an experiment does not always serve the function of testing a theory, 
neither does a model always have to render an empirical phenomenon amenable 
to subsumption under a pre-existing theory. While traditional analyses of 
modelling may give us a good enough grasp of the various functions of models in 
situations where the underlying theory cannot be applied directly, an analysis of 
its exploratory uses is needed to account for situations where an underlying 
theory is unavailable, or where––as James Clerk Maxwell put it––it is essential 
‘to avoid the dangers arising from a premature theory’ (2016, 75).4 
Gelfert further emphasises that just as exploratory experiments do not limit their possible 
outcome on the basis of an extant theory, so exploratory models investigate the consequences 
of specific hypotheses in the absence of an extant theory of the phenomena under 
investigation. However, he also hurries to add that ‘it would be misleading to think of 
exploration as entirely theory-free’ (ibid., 78). When devising and interpreting exploratory 
experiments scientists usually rely on ‘significant background knowledge, including 
background theories’ (ibid.).  
Gelfert identifies four different kinds of exploratory models in terms of four more specific 
exploratory functions that he sees as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. First, in 
the absence of a well-formed theory, exploratory models can function as a starting point in a 
series of models that are more and more realistic. For example, he notices that in the absence 
of a theory of how humans behave when driving their vehicles in the traffic, early models of 
traffic flows were sometimes inspired by the physical theory of fluid dynamics. However, a 
variety of further factors had to be included to produce increasingly realistic models (e.g., 
roadway conditions, drivers’ preferred maximum speed, drivers’ reaction time, etc.).  
Second, exploratory models may feature in proofs-of-principle demonstrations where they 
may establish that a certain approach can generate representations of a target or that specific 
mechanisms or processes can exhibit the sort of behaviour that is associated with the target. 
For example, the significance of the Lotka-Volterra model of dynamical interaction between 
predator and prey populations does not rely on making empirically adequate predictions 
about the dynamic interaction of any real populations. Instead, the model opens up a new way 
of mathematically modelling the dynamic interaction of populations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Gelfert is here quoting Maxwell (1890, 159).	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Third, exploratory models may help us devise potential explanations by ‘envisaging scenarios 
that, if true, would give rise to the kinds of phenomena that constitute the explanandum’ 
(Gelfert 2016, 87). For example, Maxwell’s mechanical model of the aether helped him to 
explore the physical geometry of magnetic lines of force by imagining a sea of molecular 
vortices of aether and ordinary matter.  
Fourth, some models may lead to assessing the suitability of a target. That is, sometimes 
models can be explored to identify a target. This happens when knowledge of the target is 
still largely incomplete and the model itself serves to explore and identify a particular target. 
 
3. Three main concerns with Gelfert’s notion of exploratory models 
I have three main concerns with Gelfert’s notion of exploratory model. First, the analogy 
between exploratory experiments and exploratory models is only a starting point and more 
work is needed to understand how important it really is to carve out a notion of specific 
exploration as a function of exploratory models. The key to the analogy is the idea that 
exploratory experiments are performed and exploratory models are developed in the absence 
of a mature theory of the phenomena under investigation. This, however, is quite vague. To 
what extent can the analogy be further developed? Are there any more similarities between 
exploratory experiments and exploratory models?  
Gelfert remarks that extending the sort of considerations made about exploratory experiments 
to exploratory models is not straightforward. For example, he submits that the sort of 
exploratory strategies involved in exploratory experimenting may not be equally interesting 
and informative in the case of modelling. He reports that Steinle (1997) includes ‘varying a 
large number of different experimental parameters’ as one of the main exploratory strategies 
involved in exploratory experiments. But he claims that ‘variation of experimental parameters 
requires skills and, when successful, constitutes a great achievement’ (ibid., 79), while 
variation of parameters in the case of mathematical models involving polynomial equations 
‘may come too cheaply’ and would be ‘exploratory at best in a generic sense’ (ibid., 79, 
author’s original emphasis). But why is it important how difficult any particular strategy is in 
order to characterize it as exploratory? Gelfert does not offer any principled reason to 
attribute the label ‘exploratory’ only to activities that purportedly require more skills than 
others.  
This brings me to my second concern. Gelfert’s use of the term ‘exploratory model’ seems to 
be at odds with the way in which the term is used within the practice of modelling. Some 
modellers use it to characterise highly complex mathematical models involving exactly the 
sort of variation of parameters that Gelfert dismisses as too cheap to count as genuinely 
exploratory. For example, in a paper called ‘From lamprey to salamander: an exploratory 
modeling study on the architecture of the spinal locomotor networks in the salamander’, 
Bicanski et al. (2013) present a computational model based on the high-level similarity 
between the salamander and lamprey mode of swimming (anguilliform swinging). The model 
involves taking an established empirically grounded model of the lamprey locomotor network 
and exploring which neuronal parameters (such as strength of ionic currency and calcium 
inflow and decay rates) need to be changed or added to account for salamander’s specific 
biological data. The use of the term ‘exploratory’ in this context does not seem to be generic 
but rather specific to the particular computational modelling strategy involved in this area of 
investigation.  
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What other strategies used in the oractice of modelling are specifically exploratory? I do not 
have an answer to this question. But, presumably, a preliminary taxonomy should emerge 
from careful consideration of the strategies involved in what scientists themselves call 
exploratory models. Their uses of the term ‘exploratory model’ may be in need of 
regimentation. Perhaps some use the term in one way while others use it in another. The work 
of the philosopher would then be that of observing how scientists think and talk about 
exploratory models with the aim of discerning certain underlying features, including 
background epistemic conditions such as lack of a mature theory of the phenomena under 
investigation, exploratory strategies such as the variation of parameters in a mathematical 
model, specific purpose of enquiry such as investigating the possible consequences of certain 
phenomena (I’ll come to this below), and possibly more.  
Third, Gelfert’s characterisation of exploratory models is too narrow. Others have already 
used the expression ‘exploratory model’ when reflecting on certain uses of models in areas 
such as engineering, management and policy analysis. For example, Bankes (1993) 
distinguishes between two different uses of computer modelling for policy analysis in 
complex systems such as economic forecasting, global climate change, and military 
procurement, which he calls consolidative modelling and exploratory modelling. 
Consolidative modelling consists in ‘building a model by consolidating known facts into a 
single package and then using it as a surrogate for the actual system’ (ibid., 435). The 
consolidative approach serves the aim of integrating and improving our understanding of the 
behaviour of complex systems when sufficient information is available. Exploratory 
modelling, on the contrary, is performed when ‘insufficient knowledge or unresolvable 
uncertainties preclude building a surrogate for the target system’ (ibid.). On this 
interpretation, exploratory models are developed when there isn’t enough critical information 
and data about the phenomena under investigation. In this case, the modeller ‘must make 
guesses at details and mechanisms’ and thereby build a model which ‘does provide a 
computational experiment that reveals how the world would behave if the various guesses 
were correct’ (ibid.).  
Bankes’ characterisation of exploratory models can include Gelfert’s characterisation. 
Exploratory models, on Bankes’ account, are characterised in terms of different sorts of 
missing knowledge of the phenomena under investigation. More specifically, exploratory 
models are models that cannot be validated experimentally because, for example, 
experiments cannot be carried out, historical data are incomplete, and inherent uncertainty or 
the absence of a mature theory do not allow making predictions. Therefore Bankes’ notion is 
broader than Gelfert’s notion, but presumably the latter characterizes one species of 
exploratory models among others. In other owords, the analogy with exploratory experiments 
may carve out a notion that is too narrow to capture the wider range of types of exploratory 
models that is captured by Bankes’ notion.  
The upshot of this discussion is that the analogy between exploratory experiments and 
exploratory models constitutes an original contribution to the contemporary debate on 
scientific models. Yet, far more work is needed to understand what the analogy really 
amounts to. Gelfert does not look at the ways in which scientists use the expression 
‘exploratory model’ and dismisses certain examples of exploratory strategies without 
providing any good reason. And his original notion seems to be too restrictive in that it 
excludes several examples of exploratory models that are not characterised in terms of the 
analogy with exploratory experiments. This calls for a development of the notion of 
exploratory models that pays attention to scientific practice and identifies certain relevant 
features of what scientists themselves call ‘exploratory models’, if and when they do so.  
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5. Conclusions 
Overall Gelfert’s book presents an informative introduction to the main issues discussed in 
the contemporary debate on models that both experts and novices may find useful. 
Furthermore, Gelfert advances a genuinely new notion of exploratory models that deserves to 
be further studied.	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